Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2000

Edward F. Lovato v. Petra Lovato : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald C. Barker; Thomas E. Stamos; Attorney for Defendant and Appellant Edward Lovato.
Monica Z. Kelley; Kelley and Kelley, LC; Attorney for Respondent/Appellee Petra Lovato.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Lovato v. Lovato, No. 20000337 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2736

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

EDWARD F. LOVATO,
Petitioner and Appellant,
BRIFI Ol APPELLANT

vs.
PETRALOVAIO
Respondent and Appelle.

Appellate Court No. 200003 3 7CA'inai

. . y"' 4'»i 1.1424

• Ronald E. Nehring
Priority Classification i;5

^ ? >if *x* %i* ^ # *i#
0^ #P» #j% ^ » #p» # ^

^ P P ^ Z F7?OM COURT RULING OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE RONALD E. NEHRING PRESIDING
%L» '«A» «JL# fct# iJL# <L»
•#J» •<!"* •"i|,% »J|% #1% r j %

RONALD c. BARKER, #0208
THOMAS E. STAMOS, #5885
Attorney for Defendant & Appellant
Edward Lovato
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: (801)5486-9636

MONICA Z. KELLEY, #7563
KELLEYANDKELLEY, IX
Attorney for Respondent /Appellee
Petra Lovato
1000 Boston Building
Nine Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah84 IN
Telephone: (801) 53L6^5f» — - .

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

EDWARD F. LOVATO,
Petitioner and Appellant,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
PETRA LOVATO
Respondent and Appelle.

Appellate Court No. 20000337CATrial Court No. 974904424
Trial Judge Ronald E. Nehring
Priority Classification 15

APPEAL FROM COURT RULING OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE RONALD E. NEHRING PRESIDING

RONALD C. BARKER, #0208
THOMAS E. STAMOS, #5885
Attorney for Defendant & Appellant
Edward Lovato
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: (801) 5486-9636

MONICA Z. KELLEY, #7563
KELLEY AND KELLEY, LC
Attorney for Respondent /Appellee
Petra Lovato
1000 Boston Building
Nine Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)531-6686

I. LIST OF PARTIES
Because all parties are listed in the caption on the cover, a separte list of paries is not
included, as provided by URAP 24(a)(1).

i

II. TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. LIST OF PARTIES

i

II. TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii

III. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

vi

IV. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
1

1
1

V. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
2

1
1

VI. RELATED PRIOR APPEALS
3

1
1

VII. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
A. Issues
4. Whether the court erred when it ruled that
a. Mr. Lovato pay alimony
b. Mr. Lovato had the ability to pay attorney fees
c. Ms. Lovato's equity in the marital residence should bear
an interest rate
d. Insurance proceeds were a marital asset

2
2
2
2
2

B. Standards of Review
5. Alimony
6. Property Division
7. Attorney Fees

2
2
2
2
3
3

VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

A. Nature of the Case
8
9

3
3
4
a

B. Course of Proceedings
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6

C. Summary of Relevant Facts
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

6
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
9
9
9
9

IX. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
36

10
10

X. ARGUMENT
A. Evidence in the Divorce Proceeding Was Not Sufficient To Sustain the
Court's Award of Alimony and Offset That Alimony Against Child
Support
37. Elements necessary to determine an award of alimony

10

in

10
10

38. Mr. Lovato's lacks ability to pay alimony
a. The Court improperly reduced Mr. Lovato's transportation
expenses
i. Mr. Lovato's automobile expenses
ii. In contrast, Ms. Lovato's automobile expenses
b. The Court reduced "other expenses"
i. Mr. Lovato's food and household supplies
ii. In contrast, Ms. Lovato's food and expenses
iii. Mr. Lovato's "other expenses."
iv. Ms. Lovato's "other expenses."
c. The lower court overstated of Ms. Lovato's expenses
d. Attorney fees not included in total living expenses of Mr.
Lovato
e. Available funds; error in lower Court's computation
f. Corrected child support
g. Mr. Lovato's corrected income
h. FICA payroll tax deductions
i. Utah income tax payments
j . Mr. Lovato's net available funds
k. Mr. Lovato's monthly expenses increase to cover attorney
fees
1. Imputed income
m. Paying alimony instead of court ordered payments to
bankruptcy trustee
n. Ms. Lovato's work history
o. Equalizing standard of living
p. Funds available to parties
39. Alimony should be paid to Mr. Lovato
40. Further, "alimony may not be automatically awarded whenever
there is disparity between the parties' incomes."
41. The Court improperly offset the child support award with
alimony
a. Child support is exempt
b. Set-off disallowed against claim in different capacity
c. Failure to pay alimony does not affect obligation to support
children

IV

11
11
12
13
13
13
14
14
14
15
15
16
17
17
17
17
18
18
19
19
20
20
21
23
23
24
24
24
26

B. Evidence Was Not Sufficient to Sustain the Court's Award to Ms.
Lovato of Attorney Fees
42. Petitioner lacks the ability to pay Respondent's attorney fees
43. Inadequate findings to support divorce decree
44. The above findings and decree are insufficient to base an
award of attorney fees to one party or the other
C. Evidence Was Not Sufficient to Sustain the Court's Award to Ms. '
Lovato of Interest on Her Equity in the Marital Residence
45. Under Utah law, interest should not accrue on Ms. Lovato's
lien
46. Award of interest makes the lien larger than the home equity
D. Evidence Was Not Sufficient to Sustain the Court's Award of lA of
Insurance Proceeds to Ms. Lovato
47. The trial court awarded Vi of insurance proceeds received as a result
of a fire on the premise after the Lovato's were separated
48. Collateral source doctrine precludes award of value of labor for
fire damage repairs to Respondent
49. To award Ms. Lovato a share of fire insurance proceeds because
the repairs were made from a "Collateral Source" is a clear
violation of Utah Case Law
XL CONCLUSION

26
26
28
29

30
30
31

32
32
33

33
34

V

III. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Court Cases
Alvordv. Ryan, 212 F. 83 (CCA 8 (Utah (1914)
Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah App. 1995)

25
2,19

Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 978 P.2d 470, 1999 (Utah Ct. App 1999)

30

Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

23

Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)

24

Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998)

27, 28

Cook v. Jones, 206 P.2d 630 (Utah 1949)

26

Dubois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 1978)

33

Enrody v. Enrody, 914 P.2d 166, 1168-1169 (Utah App. 1996)
Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990)

3,20
25

FDIC v. United Pacific Insurance Co., 20 F. 3rd 1070,1083 (10th Cir. Utah 1994) . . . . 34
First Security Bank of Utah v. Utah Turkey Growers, Inc., 620 P.2d 329 at 332-333
(Utah 1980)

25

Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1223 (Utah 1980)

11

Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. U. S. Fidelity, 949 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997)

33

Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981)

25

Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991)
In re Peterson Distributing, Inc., 82 F.3d 959 C.A. 10 (Utah 1996)
vi

2,19
25

Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985)

11

Mark VIIFinancial Consultants Corporation v. Smedley, 792 P.2d 130 at 133
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)

25

Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369,1372 (Utah 1988)

10

Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 567 (1985)

11

Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530, 536 (Utah App. 1990)

30

Pickett v. Pickett, 470 N.E. 2d 751 (Ind. Ct. App 4th Dist. 1984)

25

Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah App. 1988)
Rehn v. Rehn, 914 P.2d 306 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999)
Reich v. Davison Lumber Sales, Inc., Employees Retirement Plan, 154 B.R. 324
(D. Utah 1993)
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 111 P.2d 1382 at 1388
(Utah 1989)

3
28

25
25

Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 WL 135308, 1,3, (Utah Ct. App. 2001), 415
Utah Adv. Rep. 6, (Utah Ct. App. 2001)
Siegel v. Siegel, 400 N.E.2d 6 (1st Dist. 1979)

27, 28
26

State of Utah, Department of Human Resources v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 679
(Utah 1997)

25

Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996)
Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 551 & n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474,478 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
vii

25
24, 28
28

Utah Statutes

Utah Code Annotated, 15-1-4

30

Utah Code Annotated, 30-3-5(7)

11

Utah Code Annotated, 78-2-(3)(j)

1

Utah Code Annotated, 78-23-6(1)

24

Court Rules

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 3

1

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 4

1

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 24(a)(1)

i

Treatises

11 A.L.R. 5th 259

25

5 A.L.R. 2d 118, § 6(a)

26

Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation § 618 Setoff against alimony

25

viii

IV, STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
1. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, §78-2-(3)(j) (1996). See also Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
However, this Court obtained jurisdiction when this appeal was poured-over from the Utah
Supreme Court.
V, NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
2. This proceeding is an appeal for a Divorce Decree and Modifications thereto issued
by the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, Third District Court, State of Utah, whereby he
awarded, inter alia, alimony, attorney fees, monetary interest on the marital residence and
l

A of fire insurance proceeds. The Appellant Mr. Lovato does not contest the Findings of

Fact but instead contests the trial court's application of the law to the facts. The Appellant
Mr. Edward F. Lovato ("Appellant/Petitioner/Mr. Lovato") sued the Appellee Ms. Petra
Lovato ("Appellee/Respondent/Ms. Lovato") for divorce. Ms. Lovato counterclaimed. The
case went to trial before Judge Nehring beginning September 3,1999 The trial court did not
enter separately Conclusions of Law but entered combined conclusions and findings under
the heading Findings of Fact and an Amended Divorce Decree.
VL RELATED PRIOR APPEALS
3. There are no prior appeals relating to this matter.

1 - Brief of Appellant

VII. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
A. Issues.
4. Whether the court erred when it ruled that
a. Mr. Lovato pay alimony. The court failed to properly apply the factors in setting
alimony and offset child support by the alimony amount.
b. Mr. Lovato had the ability to pay attorney fees. Ms. Lovato failed to
demonstrate that Mr. Lovato had the ability to pay Ms. Lovato's attorney fees and that the
findings do not support such award.
c. Ms. Lovato's equity in the marital residence should bear an interest rate. The
Court went beyond its authority when it ruled that Ms. Lovato's equity in the marital home
should bear interest.
d. Insurance proceeds were a marital asset. Despite evidence to the contrary, Vi of
the insurance proceeds from a house fire were awarded to the Ms. Lovato.
B. Standards of Review.
5. Alimony. Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony and
property distribution in divorce cases.1 A trial court's conclusions of law with respect to
alimony are reviewed for correctness, accordingly no deference is given to the trial court.2

1

Howell v. Howell 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991).

2

Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah App. 1995).
2 - Brief of Appellant

In the instant case, since the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are not consistent with
the Divorce Decree, the appellate court must review for correctness giving no deference to
the trial court.3 Further, Mr. Lovato does not contest the Findings of Fact but instead contests
the trial court's application of the law to the facts. The trial court did not enter separately
Conclusions of Law but entered instead combined conclusions of law with the findings of
fact under the heading Findings of Fact and also an Amended Divorce Decree.
6. Property Division. A Court's distribution of property in a divorce proceeding is
"endowed with presumption of validity and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly
unjust or clear abuse of discretion."4
7. Attorney Fees. Whether the trial court's findings of fact in support of an award
of attorney fees are sufficient is a question of law, reviewed for correctness.5
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
8. This is an appeal from a Divorce Decree and its modification thereto issued by the
Honorable Ronald E. Nehring whereby he awarded, inter alia, alimony, attorney fees,
monetary interest on the marital home and lA of fire insurance proceeds to Ms. Lovato despite

See Appendix "A" copy of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated November 2, 2000 (Court
Record, 333-347) and Amended Divorce Decree dated November 1, 1999 (Court Record, 394-410).
4

Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah App. 1988).

5

Enrody v. Enrody, 914 P.2d 166, 1168-1169 (Utah App. 1996).
3 - Brief of Appellant

evidence and findings to the contrary. The Divorce Decree was entered on September 30,
1999 and then amended on November 1, 1999.6 The Mr. Lovato sued Ms. Lovato for
divorce. Ms. Lovato counterclaimed. The case went to trial before Judge Nehring beginning
September 3,1999. The case was taken under advisement and the judge issued his ruling in
open court on September 30, 1999.
9. The Honorable Ronald E. Nehring found for Ms. Lovato on issues regarding
alimony, attorney fees, monetary interest on marital residence and awarding lA fire insurance
proceeds to Ms. Lovato. He entered his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared
by Ms. Lovato.7 However, since the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are
inconsistent with the Amended Divorce Decree and no conclusions of law are stated
separately, Mr. Lovato appeals the Amended Divorce Decree. The decision of th trial court
is contrary to the findings of facts and the evidence presented at trial.
B. Course of Proceedings. The Course Proceedings are as follows:
10. On October 9, 1997 Mr. Lovato filed for divorce in the Third District Court in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.8

6

See copy of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law attached herewith as Appendix "A" and Amended
Divorce Decree attached herewith as Appendix "B", both incorporated herein.
7

See copy ofFindings of Fact and Conclusions of Law attached herewith as Appendix "A" and
incorporated herewith.
8

See Court Record, pages 1-5.
4 - Brief of Appellant

11. On October 30, 1997 Ms. Lovato answered and counterclaimed.9
12. After various discovery and various motions the court entertained on April 2,
1998 a motion to bifurcate proceedings.10 The motion was granted and the decree of divorce
entered on April 16, 1998.u
13. On September 3, 8, 10 and 30, 1999 this case was tried before the Honorable
Judge Ronald E. Nehring.12
14. On October 25, 1999 Mr. Lovato filed his Objections to Proposed Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law with the Court.13
15. On November 4, 1999 the Court rejected in a Minute Entry Mr. Lovato5s
Objection to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.14
16. Then, on November 11,1999 Mr. Lovato filed a Motion For A New Trial Or To
Correct Findings & Decree.15

9

Id. Pages 8-19.

10

Id. Pages 145-146.

11

Id. Pages 153-154.

12

Id. Pages 476-478.

13

Id. Pages 373-393.

14

Id. Page 411.

15

Id. Pages 413-418.
5 - Brief of Appellant

17. On March 23, 2000 the Court denied Mr. Lovato's Motion.16
18. On April 18, 2000 Mr. Lovato filed a Notice Of Appeal and a Cost Bond.17
C. Summary of Relevant Facts. The relevant facts as cited in the divorce decree
are as follows:
19. The parties were awarded joint legal custody of the two minor children with
primary physical custody awarded to Mr. Lovato subject to Ms. Lovato's liberal visitation..18
20. It was ruled by the court that Mr. Lovato had a monthly income of $3,153 and Ms.
Lovato's income was $1,801.19 20
21. Ms. Lovato was ordered to pay child support to Mr. Lovato in the amount of
$364.00 per month.21
22. Mr. Lovato was ordered to maintain health insurance, provide such verification
to Ms. Lovato yearly, with Ms. Lovato paying lA of all out of pocket expenses and health

16

Id. Pages 430-31.

17

Id. Pages 452.

18

See Amended Divorce Decree attached as Appendix "B", page 2, para 3 and 4, see also Court Record,

page 395.
19

See Amended Divorce Decree attached as Appendix "B", page 2-3, para 5 and 6, see also Court
Record, page 396.
20

Both of these income numbers are contested herein. See Argument below.

21

See Amended Divorce Decree attached as Appendix "B", page 3-4, para 7-11, see also Court Record,

page 396.
6 - Brief of Appellant

insurance premiums incurred on behalf of the minor children. This amount it was determined
was $75.39.22
23. Ms. Lovato's combined child support and insurance premium obligation was
S439.69.23
24. Mr. Lovato was ordered to pay any and all marital debts and to hold Ms. Lovato
harmless against those debts subject to Ms. Lovato paying Vi of medical expenses incurred
on behalf of the minor children.24 Those debts include the first and second home mortgages
totaling $ 109,564, and $ 19,609.43 in motor vehicle loans. Both of these debts were incurred
when the parties were married.
25. The personal property of the parties were awarded in alternating fashion.25
26. Each party was awarded a Vi equity interest in the marital home. Total equity was
determined to be $20,446.26
27. Mr. Lovato received insurance proceeds resulting from a fire of the marital
residence after Ms. Lovato left the home. The insurance proceeds were determined to be
$17,413.58. Mr. Lovato testified at trial that he re-built the home with the help of his friends
22

Id., page 4, para 12-13, Id at 397.

23

Id., page 4, para 14, Id at 397.

24

Id., page 5, para 14, Id at 398.

25

Id., page 5, para 18-20, Id at 398.

26

Id., page 6-7, para 25, Id at 399.
7 - Brief of Appellant

and business associates to save money, that the house was still valued at $130,000 and that
cash value of some of the proceeds were used for living expenses while he was out of work
due to illness. Of the $17,416.58 received, the court ruled that $14,913.58 was not expended
for home repair and awarded lA of that amount, or $7,456.79 to Ms. Lovato.27
28. Therefore, Ms. Lovato's total ownership interest in the marital residence was
valued at $15,399.79, i.e., $10,223 in accrued equity plus $7,456.79 in insurance proceeds
less $2,280 in medical expenses outstanding.28
29. Ms. Lovato was awarded a lien on the $15,399.79 amount at an interest rate of
6.513% per annum.29
30. Ms. Lovato was awarded $400 per month in alimony30 The net difference is
$39.69. Ms. Lovato was ordered to pay the $39.69 to Mr. Lovato, lA to be paid on the 5th and
Vi to be paid on the 20th of each month.31
31. The court awarded alimony, inter alia based on the following:
o Mr. Lovato was the primary wage earner during the marriage;32
27

Id., page 7-8, para 25-31, Id at 400-01.

28

Id., page 8, para 31, Id at 401.

29

Id., page 8, para 32, Id at 401.

30

This effectively nullified any child support awarded to Mr. Lovato.

31

Id., page 13-14, para 49-50, Id at 406-407.

32

Id., page 9, para 36, Id at 402.
8 - Brief of Appellant

o Mr. Lovato's income was greater than Ms. Lovato's;33
o Mr. Lovato had the ability to increase his income due to a side business;34
o Ms. Lovato needed to obtain proper housing;35 and,
o Mr. Lovato's standard of living was higher than Ms. Lovato.36
32. Again, Mr. Lovato's child support award was to be offset by Ms. Lovato's
alimony award. The trial court instructed Ms. Lovato to pay Mr. Lovato $39.69 per month.37
33. Ms. Lovato was awarded Vi of Mr. Lovato's pension plan since the date of the
marriage.
34. Ms. Lovato and Mr. Lovato were ordered to share the children as tax exemptions.
The formula was based on who would benefit the most from the exemptions and paying that
Vi of that benefit to the non-claiming party.39 This however was amended to be effective as
of January 1, 2000 whereby each party would take one child as a tax exemption.40
35. Mr. Lovato was ordered to pay Ms. Lovato's attorney fees of $11,771.4l
33

Id., page 9-10, para 36-39, Id at 402-403.
Id., page 9, para 37, Id at 402, see also Court Record 479, (transcript), page 7.

35

Id., page 11, para 40, Id at 404.

36

Id., page 12, para 44, Id at 405.

37

Id., page 13-14, para 50, Id at 406-407.

38

Id., page 14, para 52-54, Id at 407.

39

Id., page 14-15, para 56-58, Id at 407-408.

40

See Court Record, page 434-435.

41

Id., page 15, para 59-60, Id at 408.
9 - Brief of Appellant

IX. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
36. The Court erred when it ruled that: (1) Mr. Lovato pay Ms. Lovato alimony and
that this alimony be offset by child support received from Ms. Lovato, (2) Mr. Lovato pay
Ms. Lovato's attorney fees, (3) Ms. Lovato's equity in the marital home bear interest and (4)
the insurance proceeds from a house fire was a marital asset. This, in practicable terms,
resulted in the following: Mr. Lovato was awarded the parties' minor children without child
support42, responsibility and upkeep of the marital residence without an equity interest,43 rebuild the marital home after a fire with lA of the insurance proceeds necessary to re-build and
pay Ms. Lovato's attorney fees. The resultant inequity is unfair and unjust.
X, ARGUMENT
A. EVIDENCE IN THE DIVORCE PROCEEDING
WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN THE COURT'S AWARD OF ALIMONY
AND OFFSET THAT ALIMONY AGAINST CHILD SUPPORT
37. Elements necessary to determine an award of alimony. The purpose of
alimony is to enable the receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard of
living enjoyed during the marriage.44 However, when there are limited funds, the alimony

Mr. Lovato was awarded physical custody of the parties' minor children,; namely Christopher and
Alexander. See Record, page 395.
43

The trial court ruled that Ms. Lovato's interest in the marital residence bear an interest rate of... See...

44

Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1988).
10 - Brief of Appellant

award may, of necessity, fall short of providing the total amount required to maintain the
spouse at that level.45 The Trial Court shall consider the following factors in determining
alimony: (1) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (2) the recipient's
earning capacity or ability to produce income; (3) the ability of the payor to provide support;
and, (4) the length of the marriage.46

The Trial court did not adequately take into

consideration evidence regarding the above referenced elements specifically elements (2) and
(3).
38. Mr. Lovato's lacks ability to pay alimony. Specifically, the Court's Decree
TJ36-5147 and other related provisions, incorrectly find (i) that Mr. Lovato's standard of living
is higher than Ms. Lovato', (ii) that she has a need for alimony to obtain suitable housing to
meet her parenting responsibilities, and (iii) that Mr. Lovato has the ability to pay alimony
by reducing his living expenses and by working a second job.48 Those conclusions are in
error for various reasons, including the following:
a. The Court improperly reduced Mr. Lovato's transportation expenses.

^ Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 567 (1985).
46

UCA, Section 30-3-5(7). See also Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).

47

See Court Record, pages 402-407.

48

In Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1223 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court held that it is
allowable to take in consideration limits on earnings of the spouse when that spouse has custody of the parties' minor
children.
11 - Brief of Appellant

i.

Mr. Lovato's automobile expenses.

The Court erroneously

concluded that Mr. Lovato's $27549 per month automobile expense could be reduced and the
saving applied toward alimony. Mr. Lovato drives a minimum of 650 miles to work each
month50 and estimates that he drives a minimum of 200 miles per month transporting the
children51 to activities, driving to the grocery store, church and for other family purposes, for
a total of not less than about 850 miles per month. IRS (very conservative) regulations52 fix
the per mile cost of driving an automobile at 32.50 per mile. Using that rate per mile Mr.
Lovato's monthly cost is $276,53 which is slightly higher than the $275 listed by Mr. Lovato
as his monthly automobile expense. As a practical matter, Mr. Lovato's vehicles are old,
repair and maintenance costs are high. The $275 includes insurance on his vehicles. Mr.
Lovato's vehicle payments of approximated $560 per month,54 are being paid through his
bankruptcy and are not included as part of his automobile expense. It is not realistic to
conclude that Mr. Lovato, with his need to drive to work and to care for the transportation

49

The $275 per month automobile expense includes automobile insurance of about $83 per month, which
leaves only $192 for gasoline, maintenance, repair and depreciation (or replacement cost).
50

30 miles round trip each day X 5 = 150 miles per week X 4 1/3 weeks per month = 650 miles per month.

51

Mr. Lovato was awarded custody of the parties' minor children.

52

Rev. Proc. 97-58. See 1999 U.S. Master Tax Guide § 945, page 275.

53

800 miles X 32.5^ = $260.

54

Mr. Lovato estimates that his vehicle payments were about $560 per month, however they have not been
included as automobile expense because they are being paid through his bankruptcy and they are part of his monthly
payment to the bankruptcy trustee.
12 - Brief ofAppellant

needs of the minor children, could reasonably reduce his automobile expense and create an
ability to pay alimony. Mr. Lovato objects to the Court's conclusion that he can reduce his
automobile expense and thereby create the ability to pay alimony.
ii. In contrast, Ms. Lovato's automobile expenses. In 1J39 of the
Amended Divorce Decree, Ms. Lovato lists her automobile expense as $421 per month.
After deducting her $251 payment and $60 insurance her net operating cost is $110 for one
person, as compared with Mr. Lovato' s comparable monthly cost of $ 192 for himself and two
children. Mr. Lovato's operating costs are also increased because he drives a large van to
accommodate the needs of the children, while Ms. Lovato drives a smaller vehicle.55
b. The Court reduced "other expenses". Mr. Lovato's other expenses are
at a poverty level and can't reasonable be reduced further as suggested by the Court to make
money available to pay alimony. The children should not be deprived of necessities to
improve Ms. Lovato's life style. Some examples are as follows:
i. Mr. Lovato's food and household supplies. Mr. Lovato's food and
household supply cost is $400 per month for 3 persons, or $ 133 per month, $4.3 8 per day and
$1.46 per meal per person. The actual amount available for food is less than this amount
because the $400 also includes household supplies. Ms. Lovato's cost is $250 per month for
one person, or about $8.22 per day and $2.74 per meal.

Ms. Lovato drives a compact (small) automobile, which is believed to be a 1998 Mercury Tracer.
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ii. In contrast, Ms. Lovato's food and expenses. Ms. Lovato is
allowed $1.28 more per meal than Mr. Lovato and the children. If an expense is to be
reduced to permit Ms. Lovato to acquire more suitable housing it cannot be by further
reducing food and household supplies for the children, but should be by reducing Ms.
Lovato's allowance for those items.
iii. Mr. Lovato's "other expenses." Mr. Lovato's "other expenses"
are at a "bare bones" level. He lists only minimal amounts for three persons, while the same
amount for only one person on her list are much higher. He lists $ 130 for entertainment and
incidentals, or $43 per person, while she lists $300 for the same items. Funds to pay alimony
cannot realistically be obtained by further reducing the children's living costs. Mr. Lovato
objects to the Court's conclusion that funds are available from that source to pay alimony.
iv. Ms. Lovato's "other expenses." On the other hand, Ms. Lovato's
expenses can be readily adjusted to provide funds to rent an apartment. For example, if she
has an apartment where she can visit with and entertain the children, the items marked in the
chart below with an "*" could readily be applied to pay rent. Ms. Lovato should not have a
higher standard of living than Mr. Lovato. Items marked in the chart below with a "~" sign
have been adjusted to the same per-person amount as has been allowed to Mr. Lovato and
the children. If reductions in living standards are to be made to assist Ms. Lovato to obtain
an apartment the reductions should apply equally to Mr. Lovato. If those adjustments are
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made Ms. Lovato will have about $651 per month available to pay rent or for other purposes,
as demonstrated below:
Rent (now being paid)
Entertainment (now $200-adj. to $33)
Incidentals (now $ 100 - adj. To $ 10)
Storage (unnecessary w/apt.)
Clothing (Now $30-adj. to $ 10)
Food ($250-adj. to $133)
Total reduction in expenses

$ 200*
167*90*~
57*
20117$ 651

c. The lower court overstated of Ms, Lovato's expenses. Ms. Lovato's
monthly living expenses are overstated by $ 131.44. Ms. Lovato lists child support payments
as $317.16 and children's medical as $75.59, for a total of $392.75. However, Ms. Lovato
under the prior order has only paid $261.31 per month, which results in a $131.44
overstatement of her monthly living expenses. Without considering the $651 overstatement
discussed in the preceding paragraph, at a minimum to correct said $131.44 error, the
$1,825.75 total expenses listed in f 39 of the Decree should be corrected to $1,694.31.
d. Attorney fees not included in total living expenses of Mr. Lovato. In fflf
59 and 60 of the Amended Decree of Divorce56 the Court concludes that Mr. Lovato must
pay attorney fees of not less than $19,811,57 an overwhelming task. If he were able to pay
56

See Court Record, page 408.

57

Not less than $8,040 fees incurred by Mr. Lovato and $11, 771 incurred by Ms. Lovato, a total of
$19,811. Actual fees owed by Mr. Lovato to his attorney are now several thousand dollars higher as a result of posttrial work.
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even $100 per month to each attorney, a total of $200 per month,58 and if no interest were
charged, it would take about 99 months or 4 Vi years to pay the attorney fees. If Mr. Lovato
is unable to work out satisfactory arrangements for payment of attorney fees he would be
required to somehow include those payments in his pending bankruptcy, which will
substantially increase the monthly payment to the bankruptcy trustee and further reduce his
ability to pay alimony. As a practical matter, award to Ms. Lovato of her attorney fees
makes payment of alimony virtually impossible. Therefore, Mr. Lovato is not in a better
financial position to pay Ms. Lovato's attorney fees," and not supported by the evidence, an
abuse of discretion and because as a practical matter he simply lacks the ability to pay her
attorney fees.
e. Available funds; error in lower Court's computation. In f 41 of the
Amended Decree59 the Court's computations may be in error. Mr. Lovato's bi-weekly pay
is $ 1,434.02, not $ 1,484.90. If we reduce that amount by the $30 tool allowance, the net biweekly amount is $ 1,404.02. If we multiply that by the 26 pay periods in a year, his annual
income is $36,504.52 - 12 months = $3,042.04 instead of the $3,253 computed by the Court
as stated in f 41 of the Decree, an overstatement in Mr. Lovato's income of $210.96 per
month.
58

It appears that realistically Mr. Lovato may be able to pay a total of only $100 per month on fees, which
would take about 8 1/4 years.
59

See Court Record, page 404, see also Court Record 479, (Transcript) page 3-6.
16 - Brief of Appellant

f. Corrected child support. The corrected child support to be paid by Ms.
Lovato based on the child support worksheet is $322.66 and her total payment including
medical is then $439.33.
g. Mr. Lovato's corrected income. Correcting Mr. Lovato's income results
in changes in ^ 43 of the Decree as follows: The net income would be changed to $2,467.85,
the child support and medical reimbursement is changed to $439.33 and the total net monthly
income is changed to $2,907.18.
h. FICA payroll tax deductions. The Court's decision incorrectly fails to
deduct FICA taxes of $194.5760 paid by Mr. Lovato. That $194.57 should be deducted from
Mr. Lovato's income to arrive at his net available funds for purposes of determining his
ability to pay alimony.
i. Utah income tax payments. Mr. Lovato's 1998 Utah income tax was $275,
or about $22.92 per month. Utah withholding tax was $87.4961 per month. Whichever
amount the Court decides to use, that amount should be deducted from Mr. Lovato's income
to arrive at his net available funds for purposes of determining his ability to pay alimony.

See para 41 of Amended Divorce Decree - FICA taxes should be $89.80 [$17.02 & $72.78] were
deducted from his bi-weekly check, X 26 pay periods = $2,334.80 per year •*- 12 months = 194.57 per month as
determined at trial.
61

Bi-weekly Utah withholding tax is $40.38 X 26 pay periods per year = $1,049.88 per year + 12 months
= $87.49 per month.
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j. Mr. Lovato's net available funds. In H 43 of the Decree, the Court has
incorrectly determined that Mr. Lovato has $3,043 of available funds from which to pay his
monthly expenses. The amount of Mr. Lovato's available funds stated in 143 of the Decree
should be changed from $3,043 to $2,492.93, computed as follows:
Corrected monthly income ffl 39(e) above]
Add: corrected child support ffl 39(f)
Total available funds before deductions
Deductions:
Deduction per Court ffi 42 & 43 of Decree]
Federal income tax withheld ffl 39(h)]
FICA taxes ffl 39(i)
Utah income taxes ffi 390)
Corrected deductions
Corrected net available funds

$3,042.04
439.33
3,481.37

$

574.19
132.19
194.57
87.4962

$

988.44
$2,492.93

k. Mr. Lovato's monthly expenses increase to cover attorney fees. The
Court should modify the Decree, ^f 43 to state that in addition to the $3,043 of monthly
expenses listed therein, that Mr. Lovato will be required to pay additional amount on attorney
fees, or an increased amount to the bankruptcy trustee if he is unable to work out a
reasonable payment arrangement with the two attorneys and is required to include those
obligations in his bankruptcy.

62

If we use Ms. Lovato's 1998 income taxes of Utah $275 [Ex. 6], then Mr. Lovato's Utah income tax
would be $22.29 per month and the corrected net available funds would be $2,558.13.
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1. Imputed income. In ^[44 of the Decree, the Court concludes that there is
insufficient evidence to impute additional income to Mr. Lovato, but then attempts to justify
the award of alimony by actually imputing income to him by its finding that Mr. Lovato
should be able to generate income from a second job from which to pay alimony.63 Counsel
for Mr. Lovato has been unable to locate any authority for the proposition that a husband
should be ordered to take a second job to pay alimony to his wife, particularly where, as here,
where he has physical custody of the children and his income is insufficient to meet the basic
needs of himself and of the children of the parties. Also, Mr. Lovato's ability to hold a
second job is severely restricted by his need to care for the two children of the marriage. The
purpose of alimony is to attempt to equalize the ability of the parties to go forward with their
lives.64 The Court has addressed only Ms. Lovato's alleged needs, not the ability of each
party to go forward with their lives.
m. Paying alimony instead of court ordered payments to bankruptcy
trustee. The Court erred in its determination in If 46 of the Decree that Mr. Lovato should
pay alimony instead of making his payments to the bankruptcy trustee. Ability to pay is a
major factor in determining whether alimony should be awarded.65 If Mr. Lovato fails to

See also Court Record 479 (Transcript), page 7.
Howell v. Howell 817 P.2d 327 (Utah App. 1991)
Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995)
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make his payment to the bankruptcy trustee his bankruptcy will be dismissed, the home and
vehicle mortgages will be foreclosed, his wages will be garnisheed and he will be unable to
support the children or to pay alimony. The Court's finding that alimony should be paid by
Mr. Lovato in view of his limited income, the cost of supporting the children, his bankruptcy,
etc. is in error, and that error is compounded by the Court's finding that Mr. Lovato should
pay alimony instead of making court ordered payments to the bankruptcy trustee. This case
is factually similar to that in Endrody66 where health problems, and child care responsibilities
hampered his ability to return to his former occupation.
n. Ms. Lovato's work history. The lower court further erred when it
concluded that Mr. Lovato, in Tf 44, has the ability to earn a much greater income, and that
Ms. Lovato allegedly has not been employed and that she has a limited earning capacity. To
the contrary, she has been heavily involved in the craft and housecleaning business for many
years and has earned substantial amounts of income. She is in good health, has no
dependents, and can work a second job without interfering with family responsibilities, as
would not be the case with Mr. Lovato if he worked a second job. Her full time job
supplements her other business activities. The finding as stated is misleading and incorrect.
o. Equalizing standard of living.

Mr. Lovato objects to Decree f 49

because it misstates the evidence and facts. If the parties standard of living and income were

66

Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ap. 1996).
20 - Brief ofAppellant

to be equalized, it would be necessary for Ms. Lovato to pay alimony to Mr. Lovato. See
chart immediately below and discussion following that chart.
p. Funds available to parties. The following summary demonstrates Mr.
Lovato's inability to pay and the inequality which will result from the Court's alimony order:
Funds available to each party is as follows:
Total
G r o s s i n c o m e ft[ 44 & 39 of Decree]

Child support & medical [worksheet]
A l i m o n y [j[49 of decree]
Adjusted income [per decree]

Corrections:
Mr. Lovato's income

68

income
$5,567.00
-0-05.567.00

210.96)
F I C A t a x [if 2(e)(4) above]
194.57)
(
69
Utah withholding
( 134.33)
10
Correction of support [worksheet] - 0 (
71
Fed. withholding tax
L 128.00)

67

(

Husband's
Income
$ 3,253.00
439.69
( 400.00)
3.292.69
(
(
(
(.

Wife's
Income
$2,314.0067
( 439.69)
400.00
2.274.31

210.96)
194.57)
134.33)
.91)
128.00) _

-0-0-0.91

See f38 of the Decree.

/TO

This $210.96 reduction in Mr. Lovato's monthly earnings, as shown in ^ 52 of the Findings and f 41 and
43 of the Decree, where the Court concluded that $2,643.09 is Mr. Lovato's monthly income, before adding $439.69
of child support and medical payments to be paid by Ms. Lovato to Mr. Lovato. See ^ 2(e) (above) where Mr.
Lovato asks the Court to correct that error.
The corrected computation is as follows: $1,434.02 per week - $30 tool allowance = $1,404.02 X 26 pay
periods per year = $36,504.52 - 12 month = $3,042.04 per month. This is $210.96 less than the $3,253 per month
shown in f 52 of the Findings and If 41 of the Decree.
Utah withhold tax on bi-weekly earnings of $1,300.93 with three (3) exemptions is $62 x 26 pay periods
in a year = $1,612 per year -M2 = $134.33 per month. This amount has been used in the foregoing computation.
The corrected child support worksheet shows a total obligation of $439.33 instead of $439.69 used by
the Court in f 52 of the Findings and f 43 of the decree, a decrease of 910.
71

This is the monthly Federal withholding tax shown on Mr. Lovato's pay stub, converted from bi-weekly
to monthly. This amount is small because Mr. Lovato claimed ten (10) exemptions. He will now only be entitled to
three (3) exemptions, which will increase his the amount withheld from his paycheck. Mr. Lovato's bi-weekly
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Total corrections
Income after corrections
Income after corrections (Prior page)

667.86
$4,899.14
Total
income
$4,899.14

( 668.77)
$2,623.92
Husband's
Income
$2,623.92

.91
$2,275.22
Wife's
Income
$2,275.22

Less: Debt Service

1,603.00

L603.0072

-0-

Net funds available to each party

3,296.14

1,020.92

2,275.2273

Monthly living exp. [if 43 & 39 of decree]

3,266.75

L440.0074

L826.7575

Monthly surplus or (deficit) with alimony $

29.39

($ 419.08)

$ 448.47*

Monthly surplus or (deficit) w/o alimony $

29.39

($ 19.08)

$ 48.47

Federal withholding tax will be $128 with three exemptions [Mr. Lovato & 2 children] with a taxable income of
$1,300.93 shown in IRS Circular E. If we convert that to a monthly basis, Mr. Lovato's federal withholding tax will
be $128 per month, which is the amount we have used above.
As noted in K 39 above, if Mr. Lovato's income tax liability is reduced because he claims the children as
exemptions and receives the earned income credit, and he is then required to pay to Ms. Lovato lA of the income tax
savings resulting from his claiming all of the children, he will then have a net income tax liability at least equal to lA
of the amount he pays to Ms. Lovato. He should be allowed credit for income tax which he is paying through
withholding. Ms. Lovato will, in effect, receive her share of any income tax refund from the tax savings which in ^
56 in the Decree, the Court has ordered Mr. Lovato to pay to Ms. Lovato.
72

73

Mr. Lovato's debt service is as follows:
Country Wide Home Loans - 1st mortgage
Salt Lake City Credit Union - 2nd mortgage
Chapter 13 bankruptcy trustee
Total monthly payments

$ 861
139
598
$1,603

SeeH55&56above.

74

In 43 of the Decree, the Court found Mr. Lovato's Monthly Living Expenses to be $3,043. However,
since $1,603 of debt service has been deducted above, Mr. Lovato's Monthly Living Expenses has been reduced to
$1,440 [$3,043 - $1,603 = $1,440].
75

The Court has allowed Ms. Lovato $1,826 for living expenses for one person, and only $1,440 for three
persons, or an average of $480 per person. This means that Ms. Lovato is being allowed $1,346 per month more for
living expenses than is being allowed to Mr. Lovato and each of the children. As note in U 39 above, if Ms. Lovato
were required to reduce her monthly living expenses to the same amount as is being allowed to each of the Mr.
Lovato and the two children, she would have an extra $651 available, which would more than sufficient to rent a
suitable apartment.
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39. Alimony should be paid to Mr. Lovato. If we add to Mr. Lovato's debt service
a reasonable monthly payment toward his own attorney fees of over $11,00076 and the
$11,771 the Court has ordered him to pay toward Ms. Lovato's attorney fees, the result will
be to deprive the family of bare necessities. The children should not be required to suffer in
order to permit Ms. Lovato to have a higher standard of living. If, it is the Court's intent is
to equalize the available funds between the parties, as it has ruled in 1 44, 49, etc. of the
decree as proposed by Ms. Lovato, it would be necessary to order Ms. Lovato to pay alimony
to Mr. Lovato to assist him in meeting his crushing financial obligations required to support
himself and the two children. This is clearly not a case where alimony or attorney fees
should be awarded to Ms. Lovato.77
40. Further, "alimony may not be automatically awarded whenever there is
disparity between the parties' incomes."78 An underlying factor regarding the payor
spouse's ability to provide support is the payor spouse's financial need. "The payor spouses
reasonable needs are a necessary subsidiary step in determining the ability to provide

In f 59 of the proposed decree, the Court has ordered Mr. Lovato to pay his own attorney fees, which
were then $8,040. Post-trial services have increased that obligation to over $11,000.
77

If the $400 per month alimony is disallowed, then Mr. Lovato would have a monthly deficit of about $20
and Ms. Lovato would have a monthly surplus of about $50. However, the foregoing computations do not consider
the fact that the Court has ordered Mr. Lovato to also pay Ms. Lovato $11,771 in attorney fees. In addition to his own
fees of $8,040, a total of over $ 19,811. Mr. Lovato simply has no money with which to pay alimony or Ms. Lovato's
attorney fees.
78

Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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support."

In awarding alimony the court must review the payor spouses ability to provide

support. It requires more than the court stating "the defendant has the ability to pay."80
Alimony awards must also be made in light of debts assigned to each of the parties. The
court should factor in a party's share of the debt when calculating the alimony award.

81

In

essence, the Court's Decree f 44, and other related provisions, incorrectly found: (i) that Mr.
Lovato's standard ofliving is higher than Ms. Lovato,' (ii) that she has a need for alimony
to obtain suitable housing to meet her parenting responsibilities, and (iii) that Mr. Lovato
has the ability to pay alimony by reducing his living expenses, and by working a second job.
41. The Court improperly offset the child support award with alimony.
a. Child support is exempt. UCA § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(vi) exempts child support
from execution. The Court's offset of alimony against child support is, in effect, an execution
(set-off) of Respondent's claim for alimony82 against exempt child support. The set-off
violates said exemption for child support.
b.

Set-off disallowed against claim in different capacity. The right of

minor children to support cannot be "bartered away, extinguished, estopped or in any way
79

Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 551 & n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

80

Chambers v.Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

81

Willey v. Willey, 866 p.2d 547, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

82

Although alimony is also exempt under UCA § 78-23-6(1), one exemption cannot be offset against the
other, particularly where as here child support is paid to Petitioner in his capacity as custodial parent and alimony is
owed in his individual capacity.
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defeated by the agreement or conduct of the parents."83 It is well established that the child
support is an unalienable right, belonging to the child not the parent.84 Further, child support
is paid to Mr. Lovato in his capacity as custodial parent and alimony is owed in his individual
capacity.85 The Court erred in allowing a set-off of alimony owed by Mr. Lovato in his
individual capacity against child support receiver by Petitioner in a fiduciary and/or custodial
capacity. A set-off is allowed only when there is a mutual debt owing by the debtor and
creditor while acting in the same capacity. In First Security86 the Utah Supreme Court did
not permit the bank to offset funds received in a fiduciary capacity against funds in an
individual capacity, citing lack of mutuality of obligation. In a like manner, in 77mm87 the
Utah Supreme Court did not allow a counterclaim individually against a plaintiff who was

State of Utah, Department of Human Resources v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah 1997) citing Hills
v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981).
84

Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990).

85

A custodial parent is merely trustee of support payments and, therefore, has no right to contract away
benefits of trust. Pickett v. Pickett, 470 N.E. 2d 751 (Ind. Ct. App 4th Dist. 1984).
86

First Security Bank of Utah v. Utah Turkey Growers, Inc., 620 P.2d 329 at 332-333 (Utah 1980). See
also Alvord v. Ryan, 212 F. 83 (CCA 8 (Utah (1914); In re Peterson Distributing, Inc., 82 F.3d 959 C.A. 10 (Utah
1996); Reich v. Davison Lumber Sales, Inc., Employees Retirement Plan, 154 B.R. 324 (D. Utah 1993); Mark VII
Financial Consultants Corporation v. Smedley, 792 P.2d 130 at 133 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Ron Case Roofing and
Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382 at 1388 (Utah 1989)
87

Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996).
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suing in his capacity as trustee.88 In Cook89 an obligation in a fiduciary capacity was not
allowed as an offset against an obligation in an individual capacity. In
c. Failure to pay alimony does not affect obligation to support children.
By reason of his financial problems, his bankruptcy, the cost of supporting the children, etc.
Mr. Lovato will probably have difficulty surviving financially. If, for any reason, Mr.
Lovato is unable to pay alimony in full, that does not affect Ms. Lovato's duty to contribute
toward support of the children.90 The Court's set-off of alimony against child support make
the children the guarantor of payment of alimony. The Court has sufficient remedies
available to enforce payment of alimony without imposing that obligation on the children.
The Court has improperly netted $400 of alimony received by him as custodian of the
children, against child support of about $438.42 owed by him in his individual capacity, and
has thereby improperly reduced Respondent's payment to a net of about $38.
B. EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
THE COURT'S AWARD TO MS. LOVATO OF ATTORNEY FEES
42. Petitioner lacks the ability to pay Respondent's attorney fees. The lower
court abused its discretion in ordering Mr. Lovatoto pay $11,771 toward Ms. Lovato's
88

See annotation Spouse's right to set off debt owed by other spouse against accrued spousal or child
support payments, 11 A.L.R. 5th 259; Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation § 618 Setoff against alimony.
89

Cook v. Jones, 206 P.2d 630 (Utah 1949).

90

Siegel v. Siegel, 400 N.E.2d 6 (1st Dist. 1979) [misconduct on the part of the custodial parent should not
operate to deprive a child of support]. Violation of custody or visitation provisions of agreement or decree as
affecting child support payments provisions, and vice versa. 5 A.L.R. 2d 118, § 6(a).
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attorney fees. "The decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily
in the sound discretion of the trial court. However, the trial court must base the award on
evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the
reasonableness of the requested fees."91 For the reasons discussed in above, it is clear that
Mr. Lovato lacks the ability to pay Ms. Lovato's attorney fees. She is in the better financial
circumstance to pay her attorney fees. Although Mr. Lovato is in bankruptcy, he must pay
his own fees, which approximate the amount of Ms. Lovato's fees. To add $11,000 to that
obligation makes it unrealistic to assume that Mr. Lovato could pay Ms. Lovato's fees. As
demonstrated above, Mr. Lovato simply has no funds with which to pay either his fees or Ms.
Lovato's fees. On the other hand, Ms. Lovato is single, has no dependents, and has a
minimal child support payment due to the offset against alimony. She has (if in effect) been
ordered to pay only a net of $39.69 toward supporting the children. She has the ability to
resume her house cleaning business or to increase her craft business income by working a
few extra hours each week. On the other hand, Mr. Lovato's ability to work a second job is
impaired because of he is the primary caretaker of the party's two minor children. If Mr.
Lovato is required to obtain a second job this will diminish the time he is able to spend caring
for the children, helping them with the school work, preparing meals, supervising their
activities, and doing all of the things that a good parent needs to do for teen-age children.
91

Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 WL 135308, 1,3, (Utah Ct. App. 2001), 415 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, (Utah
Ct. App. 2001) quoting Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998).
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The children need Mr. Lovato even more because of the divorce. It is not appropriate to
require Mr. Lovato be away from the children working a second job so Ms. Lovato without
those responsibilities can enjoy a better standard of living. "The decision to award attorney
fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court.
However, the trial court must base the award on evidence of the receiving spouse's financial
need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees."92
43. Inadequate findings to support divorce decree. "Moreover, '[s]uch an award
[attorney fees] must be based on sufficient findings' regarding these factors. Our supreme
court has stressed, 'The trial court... must make findings of fact explicit in support of its
legal conclusions... Without adequate findings of fact, there can be no meaningful appellate
review."93 The Utah Court of Appeals as also stated "unless the record clearly and uncontrovertedly supports the trial court's decision, the absence of adequate finding of fact
ordinarily requires remand for more detailed findings by the court."94 In the instant case, the
Findings regarding award of attorney fees read as follows:
51. Petitioner should assume and pay his own attorney's fees.

92

Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 WL 135308, 1,3, (Utah Ct. App. 2001), 415 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, (Utah
Ct. App. 2001) quoting Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998).
93

Id., at 3, quoting Rehn v. Rehn, 974 P.2d 306 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999) and Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226,
230 (Utah 1997).
94

Id. at 3, quoting Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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52. It has been necessary for the Respondent to secure the
services of an attorney to represent her in this action which has
been made unnecessarily lengthy and time consuming because
of Petitioner's domestic violence against Respondent, his
financial and visitation demands on Respondent, and his
unwillingness to make reasonable efforts toward settlement.
Petitioner is in the better financial position to pay Respondent's
attorney fees and he should be required to pay the Respondent's
attorney fees and costs of at least $8,995.95
The Decree states as follows:
59. Petitioner shall assume and pay his own attorney's fees,
which have amounted to at least $8,040.
60. As Petitioner is in the better financial position to pay
Respondent's attorney fees, he shall pay Respondent's
attorney's fees and costs of $11,771 upon a showing of the
reasonableness of the same.96
44. The above findings and decree are insufficient to base an award of attorney
fees to one party or the other. Without more, stating that the Petitioner is in a better
position to pay more than $18,000 in attorney fees is totally inadequate. No consideration
is given to Ms. Lovato's need or detailing Mr. Lovato's ability to pay. Instead, the trial court
punishes Mr. Lovato for attempting to protect his constitutional right in litigating this matter.
Punishment instead of ability to pay is the standard by which the trial court determined who
should pay attorney fees. This issue should be remanded to the trial court ordering each party
to pay their own attorney fees.
See Court Record, page 346.
See Court Record, page 408.
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C. EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
THE COURT'S AWARD TO MS. LOVATO OF INTEREST ON
HER EQUITY IN THE MARITAL RESIDENCE
45. Under Utah law, interest should not accrue on Ms. Lovato's lien. Even
though Ms. Lovato did not request interest on the home equity, in ^f 32 of the of the Amended
Divorce Decree, the Court awarded interest at the 6.513% statutory post-judgment rate on
Ms. Lovato's $15,399.70 lien on the family home.97 In Osguthorpe9* the Appellate Court
affirmed denial of interest on divorce liens, and held as follows:
According to Section 15-1-4 (1986), all judgments, other than
those rendered on a lawful contract, shall bear interest at
the rate of 12% per annum." In addition, the trial court in a
divorce proceeding cannot stay statutory accrual of interest on
a judgment for unpaid child support. Stroud v. Stroud, 758 P.2d
905, 906 (Utah 1988). However, an equitable lien, unlike a
judgment, only gives the lien-holder a right to collect the
debt out of the charged property. Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldg.,
N. V.f 663 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1983). A judgement on the other
hand, is "the final consideration and determination of a court on
matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding. (Emphasis
added).
The decree awarded plaintiff exclusive use and occupancy of the
Chris Lane home subject to a non-interest bearing equitable lien
in favor of defendant for one-half of the present equity in the
home. The court stated that the lien amount should be $22,500

See Court Record, page 401.
98

Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530, 536 (Utah App. 1990).

99

Utah rate of interest on judgment as provided by UCA § 15-1-4 was reduced effective 5/3/93. See
Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 978 P.2d 470, 1999 (Utah Ct. App 1999).
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, . u t i j ;:•*: ;....-. u defend-;*^ •-•. i^,*, ^..UHMII: icinanies,
cohabits, sells the home, move:- from the home, or when the
youngest child :caches the age of majority, whichever occurs
first. The equitable lien awarded defendant has not been
reduced to judgment. Thus, defendant was aw arded an
equitable lien to which interest does not attach under section
15-1-4. We therefor affirm the trial court's award to defendant
of a non-interest bearing equitable lien m \h* parties* propem
for $22,500. (Emphasis a^« v < «;K;

46. Award of interest makes the lien larger than the home equit

•y

reason interest could properly be awarded on a divorce created lien on marital property, it is
an abu^e oi discretion to do so in this case, because with interest Ms. Lovato is awarded
$1,623 i nore thai I tl I 3 li ill e qi lit ; in: I the home, con lputed as follows:
V a l u e o f huilit - .-.*:ree1| ">,:"»|

(1)

$

Unpaid trust deeds on home: (Decree. % 25)
Countrywide Home Mtu.
Salt Lake Credit I iv •:
Total mortgage nens

(3)
(4)

Ngt equity
Lien awarded to Respondent

(5)
(6)

Petitioner's remaining equity
Interest on $15,400 @ 6.513 [n
thru 6/24/06100 =

(7)

100

Petitioner's negative equity in home

Bel ween n 1 vv ana o Z4-06 is 2,42 7 days. .
J 1,003 per year - 365 = $2,748 per day X 2,427 days = $6

$100,156
9.398
101O34
Jfi-I4r

15.40(1

*v-4(
]
6.669
$_L-623

nerest on $15,400 @ 6.513% per annum. =
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If the interest award remains it in effect it nullifies any interest that the Mr. Lovato has in the
marital residence. In essence, Mr. Lovato may continue to live in the home, pay taxes and
upkeep, pay off the mortgage and receive no present equity position in the house. The award
of interest is clearly an abuse of discretion.
D. EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
THE COURT'S AWARD OF Vi OF INSURANCE
PROCEEDS TO MS. LOVATO
47. The trial court awarded Vi of insurance proceeds received as a result of a fire
on the premise after the Lovato's were separated. In f 41 of the Findings and ^ 26 and 31
of the proposed Decree, the Court incorrectly held that $14,913.58 of insurance proceeds
from a fire was a marital asset, awarded Ms. Lovato $7,456.79 as one-half of that amount,
and included it as part of Ms. Lovato's lien on the home. Before the fire the parties owned
a home which was worth $130,000. After the home was repaired by Mr. Lovato and others
who assisted him, it was still worth $130,000. The court awarded Vi of the $130,000 to Ms.
Lovato. By also awarding her a lien for $7,456.79 (plus interest) as Vi of the unused
insurance proceeds, Ms. Lovato realized a $7,500 windfall. If Mr. Lovato had done all of
the work himself, which work was done after the parties separated,101 surely it could not
reasonably be argued that Ms. Lovato was entitled to share in the value of his work. The
Court found that on separation the parties ended their economic partnership. From and after
101

The Court fixed the date of separation as the date for valuation of the marital estate. See f 2 of the
Amended Decree.
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t h a t ( i ' l t c l l n 1 l i n n i r * s . r . , i n c f l n I, u n i t nil I)

I in I n . i f o

I \ I". Il n '.illo i,1,, in ml iMil'illii'i! I n a

windfall by sharing in insurance proceeds which were not part of the marital esiau

'- fact

that others assisted him with the work and expense does not change the situation.
i o n a t e r a l source doctrine precludes award of value of labor for fire damage
•- <

uuinuge repairs were made by ]\ Ir.

Lovato and others w ho assisted him. Ms, 1 o\;i1n is nol rntillnl to m r m * i n nnllnM Inviiuse
Mr. Lovato did not employ a contractor and pay him for the repairs, but instead obtained
repairs .lomhi.- i •. .m ; o: source." That "collateral source/' labor generated solely by Mr.
I -ovate I1"1" Is I o \ • at : • is not entitl ;xi to si lai e In Dubois

v Nye10

;

at page 825 the Utah

Supreme Court ruled:
The collateral source rule provides that a wrongdoer is not
entitled to have damages, for which he is liable, reduced by
proof t h a t t h e plaintiff h a s m , r , In „" ill ' in » nil leccive
compensation or indemnity for the loss from a n independent
collateral source. (Emphasis added).
4 ( ) To aw'riril I 11.""« I in. ul'ii ;i slmrr ni-l" In r

IIIMII

in i -i |hi u\ r e d s because the r e p a i r s

\ 'I IT m a d e from a "Collateral Source" is a clear violation of
1997 Gibbs M Smith, hu\ w U S. Fidelity103 case at page 345 the Utah Supreme Court
Kregoing language with approval

.\ppi>uiL. , mh I ,aw in 1994 the 10th Circuit

102

Dubois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 1978).

103

Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. U. S. Fidelity, 949 P.2d 337 (' I Hah I W ) .
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Court of Appeals FDIC104 case of cited the Gibbs case with approval. The "Collateral
Source" doctrine is still the Law in Utah.
XL CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein this Court should reverse trial court's decision and, inter
alia, (1) eliminate the award of alimony, (2) eliminate the award for attorney fees in favor
of Ms. Lovato, (3) eliminate the award of Ms. Lovato's fire insurance proceeds, and
eliminate interest award on Ms. Lovato's lien on the marital residence and for such other
relief as this Court deems necessary and proper.

Ronald C. Barker
Thomas E. Stamos

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing to be mailed, postage
prepaid, and/or to be hand delivered, this ^ # ^
day of March, 2001, to the following
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Monica Z. Kelley, Esq.
KELLEY & KELLEY
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Thomas'E. Stamos
FDIC v. United Pacific Insurance Co., 20 F. 3rd 1070, 1083 (10th Cir. Utah 1994).
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
1

"i 11 I i) I I N V1 I 1, \ K )• (I > I > I \ , S I ATF OF UTAH

EDWARD F. LO\ATO.

)

RE3Pe?fl)E?rr5 PROPOSES 39^
FINDINGS OF FACT AM)

Petitione:
vs.

)
)

PF1KA LK A ! « \

)
)
)

Respondent

Civil No. 974904424DA
Judge Ronald E. Nehring
Commissioner Thomas N. Ai nett

Respondent Petra Lovato. by .and through her counsel of record, Monica Kelley, hereby
submits her Proposed Findings of Fact and Concisions «>f' w im tf-u fmiti

' "isiH?r:Mn" is (his

matter is set for bench trial on September 3, 1999.
Marital History'
1.

Petitioner .and Respondent were married on May 26. 1984 and were married for 13

2.

At the recommendation of the Honorable Pat Brian and in furtherance of the

:• i :i vc, :i ience of the parties', the Court bifurcated the divorce proceeding and the Order for Bifurcation
and Decree of Divorce based on irreconcilable differences ^

,i

t« « i r ' H HI VLi

I

|l|iul1

', ".JI i he,

the parties had been married almost 14 years.
3.

At the time the bifurcation was ordered no determination was made as to when the

marital estate would be valued, and the parties would have been married more than 15 years in
September 9, 1999.
Child Custody, Visitation and Support:
4.

The parties have two minor children born as issue of this marriage: Christopher Julian

Lovato, age 13 born April 18, 1986, and Alexander Daniel Lovato. age 11 born June 24. 1988.
5.

There are no other proceedings regarding the children's custody pending in a court of

this state or any other state.
6.

The parties should be awarded the joint legal custody of the minor children, with the

primary physical custody awarded to the Petitioner, subject to Respondent's reasonable and liberal
right to visit with the minor children.
7.

Visitation should occur as the parties agree. If they are unable to agree, visitation

should occur according to the schedule set forth under UCA 30-3-35 and the parties should
incorporate the Advisory Guidelines for visitation found in UCA 30-3-33 in their visitation practices.
8.

Petitioner is employed by Salt Lake County Corporation and earns a salary of S3.217

per month gross income. In addition, he supplements his income through work at his auto body shop
which he operates to earns an additional income of S 1,500 per month.
9.

Respondent is employed by O.C. Tanner Company and earns S8.95 per hour, or SI.551

per month gross income. In addition, she supplements her income through her craft booth business
and earns an additional income of $250 per month.

11.

P u r s u a n t In 1 ' i

\

M|

s I ^ " r\

oj

I l'<: " .Lk. JIlHiitlnlj n j icu.Mili.iMt' aiiil prupci ihut

the Respondent be ordered to pay Petitioner :LS v-r.iid -i.ir--)n *: :T4 ^o -*er month which calculates the
par ties child support obligation according u, :::-J . mi^rm v_rA;u. support Guidelines and income from
one full-time job. Respondent's child support obligation should conunue until the vounr?st nf fhr«
minor children becomes 18 years of age, or has graduated from, high school during the child's normal
and expected ;; -ear • :)f gradi i ation vhi *

• IP hirt" Responaem 3 uinu Luppun obh^iuon

should be recalculated as provided for by law. and at minimum when the eldest child aims 18 years of
jge. MI has graduated Ironi high >M.[II>U1 .luring thai ehiic > normal and expected year 01 c.:aJuatk:r,.
whichever occurs later. Each of the parties should be 'under mutual obligation to notify*+". r*-uithin ten (l()i da) s of am change in monthly income.
10.

Respondent's base child si ipport award sha 11 be ["educed by 50° b for each child foi time

periods during which the child is with 'the noncustodial parent by order of the court or b> written
agreerru»ni nf thr p irii^, tor it )r ti! "u ^1 JL\V>

I

»1 1 HLA\ A

: da; s. However, normal visitation and

holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be considered an interruption of the consecutive day
raiuuiMrient.
II

Respondent shall pay her child support obligation to Petitioner one ha If by the fifth d ay

'i Lmv rnontii ana one tiair b\ the twentieth day of every month, or otherwise as. the parties may
agree.
Respondent has paid temporary" child support through the pendency of this action and
has no cm!: -.: *. arsuanttei. C A ~ M > " 1

U
v

:J us amended), Petitioner shall maintain insuran :: e

for medical expenses for the benefit of the minor children, and Petitioner should provide verification
of coverage to the Respondent, along with enrollment information and participating care providers, to
the Respondent each year by January 2nd. The Petitioner shall notify the Respondent of any change of
insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the date that Petitioner first knew or
should have known of the change.
14.

Both parties shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid b\

a parent for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion shall be calculated by dividing
the premium amount by the number of the parties' children. Presently, Petitioner maintains the health
insurance coverage for the minor children, but pays no out of pocket monthly premium expense.
15.

Both parties shall share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical

expenses, including deductibles and copayments. incurred for the minor children and actually paid by
the parties. A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and
payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment.
16. A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the
expenses or to recover the other parents share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with the
above verification requirements.
17.

The children are of an age and maturity where they do not require the supervision of

day care provider.
Provisions Relating to Debts and Obligations:
18.

Throughout the parties marriage. Petitioner was the primary income earner and

regularly worked more than one full time job to support the family financially. Respondent was a

stay-at-home parent who worked odd jobs and maintained a small craft business to supplement the
family income.
jc^

At the time of separate m flu' rMrin/s OUTV 1 ihf Inlluwmi nnni ilrb! i nil mi"1.' iHih

Home mortgage for the marital residence, John Paras Furniture for household furniture. Granite
..n? room set, and a van automobile loan.
All debt should be awaroej u °j:it;or.er as h* * ^oV md e> -"'u^ ** -^nligation, and he should be ordered
iu liuli.1 Kcsfinndciii harmless on these debts and obligations ;<,;. Dz blowing reasons: These debts are
included with Petitioner's bankruptcy petition.and are \
Petitioner under this divorce. Had the parties remained married, these debts would have been paid
from Petitioner's income fmm his i»mpiv*v n m r fi wi;, \iw pi iiiun iijuiine eoinj; i null;..
Respondent lacks the ability to pay these debts.
'()

'V'UK'ner • ."HILUUUU i,' pa;, these marital debts should be deemed his obligation in

'"eu o additional srv.vusa: support and as such should be non-discharrrear
.._ . x /eun^.v; .. ^anKruptcy petition filed in the United States Banxruptc*. L our.. Case V

g

8-

32926 should be Petitioner's sole and exclusiu* nhiu'nrun n > pn1 .mil lit; -jhuuld liuld Re 4 Hinder)!
harmless thereon.
21.

Petitioner ^'

%

• -*

. .

J:, _:;_:;; .IJSTA^SS

from liabili*v rr. a!I debts x:c orugauons incurred n> the parties prior to their date of separation in
August

: " * « - - •

s contracted bv the parties should be the

responsibility of the part)' who incurred the particular debt.
22.

Respondent should be 'ordered to assume and pay, and hold Petitioner harmless from

5

liability on, any and all debts and obligations incurred by her since August 1997.
Provisions Relating to Personal Property:
23.

During the marriage, the parties acquired certain items of personal property. Said

personal property should be awarded to the parties as follows.
24.

To Petitioner:
Most household appliances, electronics, shop tools, furniture, pictures, old living room
set with all its tables, boy's bedroom furniture. 1994 GMC Van. 1965 Pontiac, 1988
Dodge Caravan and other personal property identified on Petitioner's bankruptcy
petition valued at $12,290.

25.

To Respondent:-

BEDROOM AND MISCELLANEOUS
Chest from bedroom
Mrs. Thomas's little couch
Swag from bedroom
Picture from bathroom and wreath
Dryer
LIVING ROOM
3 new couches
Wicker stand with all its ornaments
Large tulip crate and doilies
Wall pictures including large one

Hanging plants
FAMILY ROOM
r

. v

•

> :v

Shelves with their ornaments
RouiiiJ tabli: viul'i luirs
Share of children's photos and videos
KITCHEN
Half of pots and pan-; ninr *

M

..:P<

^luir"'w:>re e:c.

Baking sheets and bouls. Recipe books
*"." ,h'H11[

m jk

'*ri f ""M :c Lneoii- wOokmi nems

RESPONDENT'S OFFICE
• .:_:;-.. picture copies, frame samples
Clothes in closet

• •:

Brown vacuum cleaner
PANTRY
Some of church's canned food supplies
Won11 .irn'i i:r,:iti : -pp!'c ,
Old records
U)RR SHOP
Scroll machine
Band saw machine

i

All craft supplies including iron flower holder, Christmas greenery, ribbons and ribbon
holder, spray cans, fabric remnants etc.
GARAGE
Table saw machine, some Christmas ornaments, gardening supplies, wood ladder.
YARD
Plant cuttings of her choosing.
26.

The Petitioner and Respondent should cooperate in the exchange and duplication of

their children's photographs and videos. Within thirty days from trial, the parties should collect the
photographs and videos and their possession and divide them as they choose. If both parties wish to
have the same photo or video, a duplicate should be made and the parties should share the cost of
duplication.
27.

All property acquired by the parties post-separation should be awarded to the person

who acquired the property, subject to him or her assuming any and all debt related to the property and
holding the other party harmless thereon, with the exception of any and all non-contributory retirement
benefits, which should be divided equally at the time of the entry of the final decree of divorce.
Real Property:
28.

During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired a home and real property located

at 5896 West Dixie Drive. West Valley City. Utah.
29.

Presently, the home has a value of at least S129,000 and has debt of S99.000, resulting

in total equity of 530,000. Both parties should be awarded 50% of the equity accrued during the
marriage, or $15,000 each.

8

30.

As Respondent has no financial assets with whirh in reestablish «i residentr w niiiiiki i

future outside of those assets acquired during the marriage, it is reasonable and proper that she should
be awarded the

i

HI 1» i hr-i ^i°«. home f/quiin. intcic11 imm Petitioner should he decide to

maintain possession of'the marital home,
"

let :«(ioiilii II.M

Hie opportunity to buy out the Respondent's 50% equity interest

accrued during the marriage within thirty (30) days from the da.
awarded judgement against Petitioner in the amount of S15.000 wn icn Petitioner should have 'the
opportunity to satisfy by rciir. -•

*

.

-._'

Respondent's SI5.000judgment i:en "Aunm 5<>da%sfroni :,d, .: he ^ an ,* v ^.r:cA h-.- udgment
nr^'

' p -' " "-

- .

;. , *.al property' as ;.:> ^orc ariu J\W,-SJ*-. proper",

subject to him assuming and paying the mortgage obligation, all tax. insurant --v -• -•-.,. .
ijijjtj linlil the Respondent harmless thereon.
>!

I f Petitioner is unable to satisfy" R?

•.

.

.::ai Jaie. then the home should be immediately placed on the open market for sale b\ •• • - <r *
cjiate agent agreed to by the parties ^ i pr'"'" n.Tommendcd hj •lit* "Til ei>ute ...r^:>

.;.> ,.::e» ^.mii

five percent ' : % ) cf the recommended listing price should be accepted by the parties, and the proceeds
of the:.:-

5:
a.

h:sL ro sa\ e\renses of * ale

b. •

5v

c.

Then ;ne balance remaining thereafter to Ir Iriilrd equall'i h:\ ntxii ihe |tdim^,

. ^

_ _ ^, .nortgages and liens;

whether or not that balance meets or exceeds the anticipated S30.000 equity interest

Q

stated herein.
33.

Both parties should be ordered to execute all necessary documents to effectuate the sale

of said property as requested by any real estate agent, loan officer or title company agent.
34.

In addition to the value of the home equity, Respondent is entitled to recoup from

Petitioner 50% of the fire insurance proceeds from a fire which occurred in the marital residence in
1998. After the parties separated, Petitioner received SI 7,404.58 as compensation for fire damage to
the marital home and he has never accounted to Respondent for this amount. Insurance proceeds
being a marital asset, Respondent is entitled to receive one-half of the proceeds collected by the
Petitioner. Respondent should be awarded judgment against Petitioner in the amount of S8.702.29.
Alimonv:
35.

Presently, Petitioner earns an income more than double that of Respondent. His

income earning history, except for 1998 when he was off work due to disability, shows he has always
been the primary income earner between the two parties, and has consistently and regularly earned the
bulk of the household income. Over a five year period. Petitioner has earned approximately 76% of
the combined marital income and Respondent has earned approximately 24% of the combined marital
income, as shown below:

i n

Income from Priniiii i I
PETITIONER

[ilr iintl Only
RESPONDENT
SIX,hl2 (S8. u : in

1998

$22,198

S: 1,663

IUU7

'[ "Uj'h'l

% .. ,810

1QQ6

S 30,240

SO

1995

S27.051

so

SI 47.147

546,085

Combined: S193232:
\\<j

"Hl 4."N

;
<:
i"

I

L<0!>e Income)

Sv,- i * \r, or -4(,o oi combined total

V n iM lul.ii

I"!ti.bcij on the historical income of the parties and their respective earning capacities,

Petitioner has the abi; m " ^

-/ ~

* -

,

more than double that of the Respondent, he has a longer work histon*' and more marketable job skills
than Respondent, he has »h thf " " n^Pf.i,
shop rrpai" kur;r:-j

IL:Mtitani ,i|jplnnenia! income through his auto body

*'e: * *"VJ:. J J > \ ear-old mar. :s at 'the prime income earning stage of'his career.
- ^ ...wred the work force full time tor the first time in

since her separation. She is a 47-year-old woman with limited work experience

I Ifr vu ml- HUMIM H>

tin tHIILHIIuiii Lhe marriage includes primarily house cleaning and, crafting. Only after th e separation, did,
she begin to work full time outside the home.
38

Respondent has the need for alimony of at least $900 per month, as her base net income

from employment is $1,100 per month, with no discretionary deductions from income, and her present
monthly living expenses with the payment of child support are approximately S1.300. Her monthly
expenses are artificially low at the present time as she resides in a residence inadequate for the longterm, and pays at present only $200 per month.
39.

Respondent has been unable to secure permanent housing because of Petitioner's

refusal to pay temporary alimony during the pendency of this action. She has Ih ed with friends and
family members and is unable to obtain adequate housing for herself and her sons when they visit. In
order to improve her housing situation. Respondent has an immediate need for alimony in excess of
that amount sufficient to subsist. Therefore, it is reasonable for Respondent to pay in alimony at least
S900 per month which will allow the Respondent to li\e in a reasonably comparable standard of living
as does the Petitioner.
40.

Further, based on the parties respective financial positions, Petitioner has the ability to

pay alimony of $900 per month and such an amount is reasonable to restore the Respondent to a
standard of living comparable to that she enjoyed during the marriage and will equalize the parties
respective standards of living.
41.

The Respondent's child support payment of S317 per month and Petitioner's alimony

payment of S900 per month should be offset against one another, resulting in a net monthly payment
of spousal support to Respondent in the amount of S583 per month.
42.

Petitioner's monthly alimony payment should be received by the Respondent one-half

bv the 15th day of each month, and one-half bv the 20th dav of each month.
43.

Alimony should continue for 15 years after the final entry of the decree of divorce, and

should terminate upon Respondent's remarriage, cohabitation or death. Should Petition—

*r

to pay alimony terminate due to Respondent's cohabitation or remarriage. Respondent's obligation to
pnv rTIi "int) ih r h 1111 >, 11pi <n 11 n \\ i1II h » inn i\ r!.

Pension and Retirement Assets:
41

. lb-ion plan or other retirement benefits through his place of

employment. Salt Lake County Corporation. It is reasonable and proper that the Respondent receive
50% of all benefits accrued •-- \ wi.uoner since the date of the marriage up to the :ime of the entrv of
the final divorce decree and J;:-.**". — .: ^ ' "•
nature.
n.

Ivi'sponileni shouii.1 : e jwardu J .in LUUU <H losses on ha >'J% share oi I'am oner s

retirement benefits awarded to her in this divorce action after the time of the entry of the final divorce
decri 1 "

Petitioner should be responsible for preparing a Qualified Domestic R elations Order
• *jDt\

* to effectuate such a division, and the parties should be ordered to share equally any costs

charged by the retirement pla n administrator to ad min ister the QDR 0
M

Respondent has acquired a small 401(k) account with a value of less than $600 since

the p< lilies separation t i- 1 lie: h she -\ ii i be a^ var led tc i: lei entii ely a s hei sole and exclusive property
Restraining Order:
I'i'UMntici "iiuul-J be permanently restrained from bothering, harassing, annoying,
threatening, or harming the Respondent at her residence, employment or anv oihr: place.

11

Income Tax Provisions:
49.

Petitioner should be awarded the right to claim the eldest child as a dependent for

income tax purposes and Respondent awarded the right to claim the \ oungest child as a dependent for
income tax purposes. This is fair and equitable as Petidoner has claimed both children as dependents
on his state and federal income tax filings for the years 1997 and 1998.
50.

Petitioner and the Respondent should be ordered to file separate income tax returns for

the year 1999 and following.
Attorney's Fees:
51.

Petitioner should assume and pay his own attorney's fees.

52.

It has been necessary for the Respondent to secure the sen ices of an attorney to

represent her in this action which has been made unnecessarily lengthy and time consuming because of
Petitioner's domestic violence against Respondent, his financial and visitation demands on
Respondent, and his unwillingness to make reasonable efforts toward settlement. Petitioner is in the
better financial position to pay Respondent's attorney's fees and he should be required to pay the
Respondent's attorney's fees and costs of at least S8.995.
Maiden Name:
53.

Petitioner should be restored the use of her former name of Cano.

Miscellaneous Provisions:
54.

Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents as are

required to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.
55.
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56.

The Court should grant such other and further relief as it may deem just and appropriate

in this matter.
DATED this 2 _ day of
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BY THE COURT:

^^UA^4,

Honorable Ronald E. Nehring
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certifv that on the

dav of

_, 1999,1 caused to be delivered by

fax and mail, a true and correct copy of the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law to the following:
Ronald C. Barker
2870 South State St.
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
fax: 486-5754
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APPENDIX B

MONICA Z. KELLEY (#7563)
KELLEY & KELLEY
Attorneys for Respondent
1000 Boston Building
Nine Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)531-6686
Fax: (801)531-6690

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

;)
)
]

EDWARD F. LOVATO,
Petitioner,
vs.

]

PETRA LOVATO,

;)
)
))

Respondent.

AMENDED
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Civil No. 974904424DA
Judge Ronald E. Nehring
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett

The above-captioned action came trial on September 3, 1999, the Honorable Ronald E.
Nehring presiding. Trial continued to September 8, 1999 and concluded on September 10,1999.
Petitioner was present at all times and represented by counsel, Ronald C. Barker and Respondent was
present at all times and represented by counsel Monica Z. Kelley. The Court, having received
evidence and heard the testimony of the parties and witnesses, and having considered the exhibits and
reviewed the file and the pleadings on file herein, and having made and entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, it is now therefore,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1.

A Bifurcated Decree of Divorce was entered in the above-entitled matter on May 4,

1998 wherein the parties were granted a decree of divorce based on the grounds of irreconcilable
differences. This Amended Decree of Divorce serves to address all issues of custody, visitation,
property division and support not addressed in the Bifurcated Decree of Divorce previously entered.
2.

The parties separated on or about August 16, 1997 and on that date as a practical

matter, the parties' ended their economic partnership. Accordingly, the valuation of property and
obligations shall be fixed to the extent possible as of that date.
Child Custody, Visitation and Support:
3.

The parties are hereby awarded the joint legal custody of the two minor children bom

as issue of this marriage: Christopher Julian Lovato, age 13 bom April 18, 1986. and Alexander Daniel
Lovato, age 11 bom June 24, 1988, with the primary physical custody of the children awarded to the
Petitioner, subject to Respondent's reasonable and liberal right to visit with the minor children.
Petitioner and Respondent shall share the rights, privileges, duties and powers of a parenthood,
pursuant to UCA 30-3-10.1 (1953 as amended).
4.

Visitation shall occur as the parties agree, with the Respondent having liberal and

frequent access to the minor children. If they are unable to agree on a visitation schedule, then
Respondent's visitation schedule shall not less than the schedule set forth under UCA 30-3-35. The
parties shall further adhere to the Advisory Guidelines found in UCA 30-3-33 for their visitation and
custody practices.
5.

Petitioner is employed by Salt Lake County Corporation and earns a monthly gross
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income of $3. 153, which does not include compensation for his tool allowance or income from any
other source.
6.

Respondent is employed by O.C. Tanner Company and earns a gross monthly income

of $1,551. plus an additional $250 per month from her craft business, for a total combined monthly
income of $1,801.
7.

Pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7 et seq. (1953 as amended) Respondent shall pay to

Petitioner child support of $364.00 per month.
8.

Respondent's child support obligation shall continue until the youngest child becomes

18 years of age. or has graduated from high school during the child's normal and expected year of
graduation, whichever occurs later. Respondent's child support obligation shall be recalculated as
provided for by law, and at minimum when the eldest child turns 18 years of age, or has graduated
from high school during that child's normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later.
9.

Respondent's base child support award shall be reduced by 50% for each child for time

periods during which a child is with the Respondent by order of the court or by agreement of the
parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. However, normal visitation and holiday visits to the
custodial parent shall not be considered an interruption of the consecutive day requirement.
10.

Respondent shall pay her child support obligation to Petitioner one-half by the 5th day

of every month and one half by the 20th day of every month, or otherwise as the parties may agree.
11.

Respondent has paid temporary child support through the pendency of this action and

has no child support arrearage owing. As Respondent is current in her child support obligation to
Petitioner, automatic income withholding shall not be ordered. However, to further the convenience
3

of the parties, the Petitioner and Respondent may coordinate the payment of child support through
automatic deposit to the recipient's bank account on a regular monthly basis.
12.

Pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.15, Petitioner shall maintain insurance for medical

expenses for the benefit of the minor children, and Petitioner shall provide verification of coverage to
the Respondent along with enrollment information and participating care providers, to the Respondent
each year by January 2nd. The Petitioner shall notify the Respondent of any change of insurance
carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the date that Petitioner first knew or should
have known of the change.
13.

Both parties shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the health insurance premium

actually paid by Petitioner for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion shall be
calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of the parties' children. Presently,
Petitioner pays SI51.19 per month for health and dental insurance coverage for the minor children,
and Respondent shall reimburse Petitioner her 50% obligation of $75.59 along with her monthly child
support payment.
14.

Respondent's combined monthly obligation to Petitioner for child support and

insurance reimbursement shall be $439.69.
15.

Both parties shall share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical

expenses, including deductibles and copayments, incurred for the minor children and actually paid by
the parties. A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and
payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment.
16.

Respondent shall pay one half of all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical
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expenses Petitioner has incurred during the pendency of this action, subject to Petitioner presenting to
her verification of expenses actually paid.
17.

A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the

expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with the
above verification requirements.
Provisions Relating to Debts and Obligations:
18.

Petitioner, shall assume and pay any and all outstanding debt as his sole and exclusive

obligation and indemnify and hold the Respondent harmless on the following debts and obligations:

19.

a.

Countrywide Home Mortgage - 5100,156 forlst home mortgage

b.

Salt Lake Credit Union - $9,398 for 2nd home mortgage

c.

John Paras Furniture: $869.52 for couch, stereo, vacuum and VCR

d.

Granite Furniture: $1,119.41 for carpet installed in marital home

e.

RC Willey: $656.83 for dining room set

f.

Salt Lake County Credit Union, $ 19,609.43 for motor vehicle loans

Any debt listed in the Petitioner's bankruptcy petition and not otherwise provided for

herein, shall be the sole and exclusive obligation of the Petitioner and he shall indemnify and hold the
Respondent harmless thereon.
20.

The parties shall share equally the uninsured medical expenses totaling $4,560 fir

hospital, dental and pharmacy bills for the minor children accrued during the marriage and prior to the
parties separation. Respondent shall pay her one-half obligation toward theses expenses ($2,280) by
reducing her lien on the marital home by that amount.
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Provisions Relating to Personal Property:
21.

All personal property not the subject of debt described in Paragraph 18 herein, shall be

distributed between lie parties through an alternating selection to be first exercised by the Petitioner.
The distribution shall occur at a time agreed upon by the parties and shall be supervised by counsel or
counsel's designee.
22.

The Petitioner and Respondent shall cooperate in the exchange and duplication of their

children's photographs and videos. Within thirty days from trial, the parties shall collect the
photographs and videos and their possession and divide them as they choose. If both parties wish to
have the same photo or video, a duplicate shall be made and the parties shall share the cost of
duplication.
23.

All property acquired by the parties' post-separation shall be awarded to the person

who acquired the property, subject to him or her assuming any and all debt related to the property and
holding the other party harmless thereon.
24.

No joint bank, deposit or investment accounts are owned by the parties. Each party

shall be awarded his or her bank, deposit or investment account owned by him or her exclusively at
the time of trial.
Real Property:
25.

During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired a home and real property located

at 5896 West Dixie Drive, West Valley City, Utah, which has a value of $130,000. At the time of
separation, the home had debt of $109,554 from the first and second home mortgages, resulting in
total equity of $20,446. Each party shall be awarded 50% of the equity accrued during the marriage,
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or SI0,223.
26.

In 1998 Petitioner received insurance proceeds of $17,413.58 to compensate the parties

for property damage caused by a fire in the marital home. The insurance proceeds are found to be a
marital asset. The parties stipulated that Petitioner paid 52,500 from the insurance proceeds to pay for
repair to the fire-damaged home, but the Petitioner failed to satisfactorily trace the balance of the
insurance proceeds to expenses related to home repairs.
27.

Petitioner testified at trial that he used most of the insurance proceeds for his living

expenses and bills while he was not working in 1998 due to illness, and that Respondent should not be
entitled to recover any portion of the insurance proceeds since the work was, in fact, done and to
award Respondent reimbursement of the unused insurance proceeds would be to reward her for the
benefit of Petitioner's effort and relationships which were used in making the repairs to the home.
28.

At the time of the fire, Petitioner wras living in the home by himself and Respondent

had no control over how the repairs were done or who did them. Petitioner alone made that
determination, and he chose to have them done at a discount and enjoyed the use of the insurance
proceeds for his general support.
29.

At trial, Petitioner testified that all the home repairs had been done in the same manner

as would a professional, only at no expense to him since the labor and materials were donated by
friends and church members. He testified that the home was fully repaired and that paying someone to
do the repairs or having them done at no cost resulted in the same condition, that the home was worth
$130,000 repaired, and therefore it was his prerogative to use almost $15,000 as he saw fit.
30.

The Court found that the $ 14,913.58 not expended for home repair is a marital asset
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and as such it shall be divided equally between the parties. Therefore, Respondent is awarded
$7,456.79, which equals one-half the value of the unused insurance proceeds.
31.

Respondent's ownership interest in the marital home is based on the home equity,

unused fire insurance proceeds, minus her obligation for joint medical expenses as follows:
50% of accrued equity

+ $10,223.00

50% of unused insurance

- $ 7.456.79

Subtotal

$17,679.79

50% joint medical

- S 2.280.00

Total
32.

$15,399.79.

Respondent is awarded a lien against the marital home in the amount of $ 15.399.79,

together with interest at the statutory post-judgment rate (presently 6.513% per annum).
33.

Petitioner shall immediately satisfy Respondent's lien upon the first of the following

events to occur:
a.

The home is sold;

b.

The youngest child turns 18 and graduates high school, whichever occurs later;

c.

The minor children cease using the home as their primary residence;

d.

The Petitioner remarries or cohabitates; or

e.

The Petitioner uses the home as security for new debt or obtains refinancing on

the home for any other purpose other than to satisfy Respondent's lien.
34.

Petitioner shall assume and pay any and all taxes, insurance, maintenance or other

obligation related to the marital home and indemnify and hold the Respondent harmless thereon.

8
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35.

Respondent shall execute a special warranty deed subject to the lien described herein.

Alimonv:
36.

Throughout the parties' marriage. Petitioner has been the primary income earner of the

household. He has always had a full-time job and presently is employed for Salt Lake City
Corporation in its maintenance division where he has worked for over 11 years.
37.

He also worked at his side business of auto body repair and owned a body shop in

Kearns. Utah that he has operated for approximately 10 years which is now closed following
Petitioner's eviction from the site of the body shop. Respondent testified that he earned between
$1,000 to $1,500 per month. Petitioner testified that the body shop had profitable years where he
earned $10,000 after expenses. Petitioner testified the shop has not been profitable for him since
1998. Petitioner testified he no longer operates the body shop and closed it a month before trial due to
his health problems and the demands of single parenthood. Petitioner testified that the shop was
usually profitable before 1997, but that due primarily to an illness. Petitioner lost customers and the
business became unprofitable.
38.

Respondent also worked throughout the marriage, but on a much smaller scale. She

had housecleaning jobs and also earned an income from her craft busines to support herself, her
hobbies and to contribute extra money to the family expenses. Respondent operates her craft business
and earns $250 per month from the same. This is in addition to her income from her regular
employment at OC Tanner, where she has earned $15,998.15 including overtime, holiday pay,
personal pay, profit sharing and vacation pay through August 21,1999. Therefore, Respondent's 1999
gross monthly income includes $2,064 from OC tanner employment, plus $250 per month from her
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craft business, for a total combined gross monthh income of $2.314.
39.

From Respondent's gross income of $2.314 per month, she has necessary deductions of

$516.29 bringing her total net monthly income from all sources to $1,797.71. With approximately
$1,800 in net income, Respondent has a need for alimony as her present reasonable expenses include:
Respondent's Monthly Expenses
J

S200 00|

•Food and Household Supplies

I

250 00J

1 Utilities Including Water, Electricity, Gas and Heat

I

75 00J

•Telephone

25 00|

1 Laundry and Cleaning

25 00|

• Clothing

50 00|

• Medical, Dental Insurance & Expenses (Exclude Payroll Deducted)

30 00 j

•Payment of Child, Spousal Support re: Prior Marriage

317 16|

•Entertainment (Includes Clubs, Social Obligations, Travel, Recreation)

200 001

1 INCIDENTALS
1 Grooming

50 00

1 Grfts

50 00
100.00|

lAUTO EXPENSES
1 Auto payments

251 00

1 Insurance

60 00!

1 Gas

eoooj

1 Oil, Maintenance Repair

50 00
421 00|

1 Installment Payment(s) - Monthly Debts & Obligations
(Storage USA

57.00|

[Children's Monthly Health and Dental Insurance Premium

75.59|

•Other expenses not specifically requested above and specify below

ITOTAL EXPENSES

$1,825.751

40.

Respondent's present monthly expenses are artificially low because her rent is $200 per

month for a bedroom she rents in a home she shares with other adults and children. Both parties
testified to the need for Respondent to obtain proper housing so she can take the minor children for
overnight and extended visits. Because of her present housing situation, she is unable to visit with the
children for any extended period of time. Respondent testified at trial that in order to obtain suitable
housing for at least an apartment, she would pay rent of at least $500 to $600 per month. A reasonable
rental payment would increase her present expenses by S3 00 to $400 per month and her home utilities
would likely increase as well.
41.

Petitioner has the ability to assist Respondent with a monthly alimony payment.

Petitioner testified at trial he receives a regular salary from his employer, and receives the same
amount of pay every two weeks: $1,484.90. After deducting $30.00 per pay period for Petitioner's
tool allowance, his gross monthly income of $3,253.00.
42.

Petitioner's monthly deductions from gross income for state and federal income taxes,

life insurance, disability insurance, union dues are $400 per month. His health and dental insurance
cost for himself and 50% of the boys' insurance is an additional $174.19. According to Petitioner's
pay check stub Petitioner has little federal income tax withheld and his 1998 federal income tax return
shows he had no tax liability for 1998. Petitioner has a deduction of $166.66 per month for "Flex
Medical" which is his discretionary medical savings account which the court does not consider to be a
non-discretionary deduction from his gross income.
43.

Therefore, Petitioner's non-discretionary deductions as well as basic medical and life

insurance withholdings total $574.19 per month, and from the taxes withheld, Petitioner receives a
refund from his income taxes withheld. Thus, Petitioner's net income totals at least $2,643.09 per

month. Petitioner's net income of $2,643.09 plus child support and medical reimbursement of
$439.69 yields a total net monthly income to $3,082.78. From this, Petitioner has monthly living
expenses of $3,043.
Petitioner's Monthly Living Expenses
• Rent or Mortgage Payments (Residence)

S1,005.00|

•Maintenance (Residence)

50.00J

• Food and Household Supplies

400.00J

• Utilities Including Water, Electricity, Gas and Heat

280.OOj

•Telephone

35.00|

•Laundry and Cleaning

80.00|

•Clothing

30.00|

• Medical, Dental Insurance & Expenses (Exclude Payroll Deducted)

60.00|

•School Tuition, Activity Expenses

100.00|

• Entertainment (Includes Clubs, Social Obligations, Travel, Recreation)

100 00|

1 Incidentals / Grooming

30.00|

• Bankruptcy Trustee Payment

598.00|

[Auto Expenses

275 OOJ

ITOTAL EXPENSES

44.

|

$3,043.001

Petitioner's standard of living is higher than that of Respondent's. He has greater

flexibility, even with his bankruptcy obligations, to reduce expenses, particularly transportation
expenses. It is equitable to shift to Petitioner the responsibility for accommodating Respondent's need
to obtain housing suitable to meet her parenting responsibilities. Although the Court has determined
that there is insufficient factual basis to impute additional income to Petitioner based on his now
defunct auto body business, the Court is confident that he can generate incomefromthis activity, even
on a hit and miss basis which, when coupled with a reduction in expenses, is more likely than not to
VI

make it possible for Respondent to meet her legitimate housing needs through the payment of alimony.
45.

Accordingly. Petitioner shall pay Respondent alimony in the amount of $400 per month

for a duration of time equal to the date of the parties' marriage through the time of trial, or 15 years.
46.

The Court acknowledges that this alimony award is insufficient to fully meet

Respondent's living needs and will leave Petitioner pressed financially to meet this obligation if he
does not generate as much supplemental business income as he has done in the past. However, the
Court views Petitioner's obligation to assist in Respondent's support as a primary obligation o\er that
of his obligation to his creditors in bankruptcy. As a matter of public policy, the Court expects the
Respondent's monthly alimony payment is the first obligation of the Petitioner's to be met. because
without the Respondent's efforts during the marriage, the Petitioner would not have a home or other
property he enjoys today.
47.

This alimony award is reasonable because Petitioner has a longer work history and

more marketable job skills than Respondent, he has the ability to generate a much greater income in a
short amount of time when compared to Respondent's work history and job skills. Petitioner is a 45year-old man and is at the prime income earning stage of his career.
48.

Respondent, on the other hand, has entered the work force full time for the first time at

the time of separation. She is a 47-year-old woman with limited work experience. Her work history
throughout the marriage includes primarily house cleaning and crafting.
49.

An alimony award of $400 per month will allow the Respondent an opportunity to

equalize her standard of living to one comparable to what she enjoyed during the marriage and will
equalize the parties' respective incomes.
50.

Petitioner's monthly alimony payment shall be offset by Respondent's child support

and insurance share payment of $439.69, resulting in a net monthly payment from Respondent to
Petitioner of $39.69. This shall be paid by the Respondent one-half by the 5th day of each month, and
one-half by the 20th day of each month.
51.

Petitioner's alimony obligation shall terminate upon Respondent's remarriage,

cohabitation or death. Should Petitioner's obligation to pay alimony terminate due to Respondent's
cohabitation or remarriage, Respondent's obligation to pay monthly child support shall be revived.
Pension and Retirement Assets:
52.

Petitioner has a pension plan or other retirement benefits through his place of

employment. Salt Lake County Corporation. Respondent shall be awarded 50% of all pension benefits
accrued by Petitioner since the date of the marriage to August 16. 1997 pursuant to the Woodward
formula.
53.

Petitioner shall be responsible for preparing a Qualified Domestic Relations Order

(QDRO) to effectuate the division of the retirement benefits as ordered herein, and the parties shall be
ordered to share equally any costs charged by the retirement plan administrator to administer the
QDRO, anticipated to be $250 total.
54.

Respondent has acquired a small 401(k) account with a value of less than $600 since

the parties' separation which shall be awarded to her entirely as her sole and exclusive property.
Restraining Order:
55.

Each party shall be permanently restrained from bothering, harassing, annoying,

threatening, or harming the Respondent at her residence, employment or any other place.
Income Tax Provisions:
56.

The parties shall share equally the right to claim the minor children as dependents for

income tax purposes. Beginning with their 1999 state and federal income tax filings, the parties shall
coordinate their income tax return preparation and file their income tax returns by March 15th of every
year. Prior to March 15th. the parties shall cooperate in the exchange of the calculation of their income
tax returns with and without the dependent exemptions and determine which party would receive the
greatest tax benefit from claiming the dependent exemption(s). The person with the greatest tax
benefit shall claim the dependent exemption(s) in any given year. The person who claims the
dependent exemption(s) shall isolate the value of the tax benefit attributed to the dependent exemption
only, and the claiming party shall pay the non-claiming party 50% of the benefit received.
57.

The claiming party shall make payment to the non-claiming part}' within thirty (30)

days of the receipt of any refund, or at the time the non-claiming part}' has tax due at the time of filing,
whichever occurs first.
58.

Should this process prove to be too time consuming, expensive, or cumbersome for the

parties based on their circumstances, the Court will entertain a Petition to Modify and make a direct
award to the parties the right to claim one child or the other as a dependent for tax purposes.
Attorney's Fees:
59.

Petitioner shall assume and pay his own attorney's fees, which have amounted to at

least $8,040.
60.

As Petitioner is in the better financial position to pay Respondent's attorney's fees, he

shall pay Respondent's attorney's fees and costs of $11,771 upon a showing of the reasonableness of
the same.

Maiden Name:
61.

The Court affirms Respondent's right to be restored the use of her former name of

"Petra Martha Cano."
Miscellaneous Provisions:
62.

Each party shall be ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents as are

required
to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.
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BY THE COURT:

THE HONORABLE RONALD^). NEHRING
Third District Coun Judge
Approved as to form

Ron C. Barker
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I herebv certifv that on the *-*• dav of

fat

, 1999,1 delivered by fax and mail, a

true and correct copy of the AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE to:
Ronald C. Barker
Attorney at Law
2870 South State St.
Salt Lake Citv. UT 84115
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